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ABSTRACT
This paper sets out three simple models of firm behavior under minimum
wage legislation. The key feature of these models is that they account for
important aspects of the government's mechanism for monitoring and enforcing
compliance with the minimum wage law. The major results of the paper are Cl)
that minimum wage legislation does not generally lead to upward movements along
labor demand curves but rather, that it often leads to movements off, and to the
left, of the labor demand curve; (2) that minimum wage legislation is likely to
have a positive effect on the distribution of wages paid to workers who would
earn less than the minimum in the absence of the legislation, but is not likely
to bring all of those workers up to the minimum; and (3) that imposing addi-
tional penalties on second offenders promotes compliance by firms with no pre-
vious violations. The paper considers the implications of these results for
empirical work on the adverse employment effects of minimum wage legislation and
for the design of government compliance mechanisms.
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Models of Firm Behavior Under Minimum Wage Legislation
I. Introduction
The employment effects of minimum wage legislation have been the focus
of a substantial number of research efforts by economists during the past two
decades (for a recent survey of these studies, see Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen,
1982). Nearly all of these efforts have been based on what is perhaps the most
robust analytical result in labor economics ——thatlabor demand curves are
downward sloping. This result seems quite unambiguous in its implication that
the legislation of a minimum wage which exceeds the market wage for a certain
group of workers will lead to a decrease in their employment. Since this result
seems so unobjectionable, the major problem for labor economists has been to
empiricallyestimate the magnitude of this employment effect (and therefore the
welfare effect of minimum wage legislation, as well). The main justification
forconstructing and publishing these estimates is that they can he an important
part of public policy debates about increasing the minimum wage.
In the past few years, economists have begun to realize that employers
may have incentives not to comply with the minimum wage law and that any
substantial degree of noncompliance may well bias downward estimates of the
employment effect of minimum wage increases. Indeed, two recent empirical stu-
dies of noncompliance have both found substantial evidence of employer non—
compliance (see Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979 and Sellekaerts and Welch, 198)4).
Given the potential significance of these findings, it is clearlyimportant to
investigatethe determinants of noncompliance. Some attempts have been made in—2—
this regard but they are all limited in their assumptions (see Ashenfelter and
Smith, 1979; Grenier, 1982; Sellekaerts and Welch, 198L, and Chang and Ehrlich,
1985). For example, all of the models equate noncompliance with payment of the
competitive wage, and they are all static in nature.
In this paper we set out several simple but more general models of
firm behavior under minimum wage legislation. We show that there are different
labor demand curves in the presence and absence of minimum wages and that mini-
mum wage legislation is likely to have a positive effect on the wages paid by
noncomplying employers.1 These findings raise serious questions about the
interpretation of most existing estimates of the employment effect of minimum
wages. We also analyze compliance behavior in a two—period model in which
second offenders are more heavily penalized than first offenders. The results
we derive from this model have important implications for the design of policies
to penalize violators of the minimum wage law. Moreover, since the compliance
problemexists in many settings in which legislators try to regulate economic
behavior, we believe that the results of our analysis extend beyond its imme-
diate labor market context.
II.ModelA
Webegin byconsidering acompetitive firm with the following charac-
teristics:(1) it has a strictly concave production function F with labor as
its only argument, (2) it would face a real wage rate Wc in the absence of mini—
1Themodels we present are all partial equilibrium in nature in the
sense that we do not allow the firm's output price or its cost of capital to be
affectedby the minimum wage.—3—
mum wagelegislation, and (3) it behaves as an expected profit maximizer. We
assume that the government has established a minimum wage rate M which is
strictly greater than Wc We also assume that the firm faces a probability A of
being inspected for minimum wage violations and that this probability is inde-
pendent of the wage the firm pays. If the firm is inspected and caught
violatingthe minimum wage law, it must make a lump—sum payment to its workers
which brings them up to the minimum wage for all of the hours they worked below
thatwage.2 Noncomplying firms are not constrained to pay W; they may pay a
higher wage if they desire.
Given this framework, the expected profit for a representative firm
can be written as follows:
(U E(Ji)=F(L)—WL—x[M—w]L
Wenow take L and W as choice variables and maximize the firm's expected pro-
fit function subject to the inequality constraint W Wc No). Assuming L >o,3
the first—order Kuhn—Tucker conditions imply14
2This assumption accurately describes the situation for most first
offenders. For example, in 1982, investigations by the Department of Labor
uncovered 149.5 million dollars of minimum—wage underpayments due to 295,000
workers. Of these totals, employers voluntarily paid 32.1 million dollars to
252,000 workers. The difference between these sets of figures represent cases
in which employers refused to pay back wages and the Department of Labor decided
against the use of litigation to enforce compliance (see U.S. Department of
Labor, 1983, p.14)
3me case L =0would imply that the firm ceases production after the
introduction of a minimum wage. Since we are interested in the effects of a
minimum wage on the actual wage paid by a firm as well as on its employment
level, this case is of little interest and will beignored in the remainder of
our analysis.
14All of the major results presented in the body of this paper are
derivedformally in the Mathematical Appendix which follows Section V._)4_
(2a) w=W
C
(2b) F'(L) =xri + [l—X]W=
C
These conditions have two important substantive implications. First, the firm
will certainly not comply with the minimum wage law since it will pay the wage
W. Thus, compliance is completely ruled out of this model. Observe that this
resultis consistent with earlier research on compliance with the minimum wage
lawin which it wasexplicitly assumed that firms pay the competitive wage
whenthey choose not to comply with the law. Second, firms will hire labor
until the marginal product of labor equals W. Since W* is a weighted average
of M and W (with X determining the weights) and since H >W,the firm will
hire less labor than it would if it paid the wage Wc in the absence of minimum
wage legislation. Thus, even when a firm does not comply with the minimum wage,
its employment levels will be affected adversely by the existence of minimum
wage legislation. Intuitively, this decline in employment results from the
firm's desire to minimize the loss of profits it would experience if it hired
workers until F' (L) =
Wc
and were caught violating the minimum wage law.5
SThis interpretation is related to the main point made in Grenier (1982).—5—
III. Model B
We now extend Model A by relaxing the assumption that A, the probabi—
lity of inspection, is constant. This is an unreasonable assumption for two
reasons. First, given the goals of minimum wage legislation, it makes the most
sense for the government to target for inspection firms that are likely to be
the worst offenders. Indeed, government inspection efforts are explicitly
designed to tlhelp the greatest number of people most in need of assistance."6
Second, most government inspections actually result from worker allegations of
minimum wage violations. Since workers are more likely to complain when they
have more to gain, it follows that inspections have a higher probability of
taking place in firms that commit the worst violations, i.e., firms that pay
wages furthest below the minimum. In fact, government compliance officers do
not deal with worker complaints on a first—come—first—served basis. Rather,
they rank alleged violations according to both their seriousness and the number
of workers affected and they investigate the worst violations first.1
We relax the assumption of a constant probability of inspection by
specifying an inspection equation in which the probability that a violation is
detected (x) depends on the difference between the minimum wage (N) and the wage
actually paid by the firm
6U.S. Department of Labor, l9T1. There is no statutory requirement
that the Department of Labor investigate all complaints of minimum wage viola—
t ions.
Thee U.S. Department of Labor, l974, p.5.
8Since the government takes account of the number of affected employees
in allocating its enforcement resources, it is also reasonable to include
employmentas an argument of the inspection equation. In order to maintain the
simplicity of our formulation, we do not modify equation (3)in this way.—6.-
(3) x =fO—W)
where A mustliein the intervalto,iiandwheref'(M—W) >0.Inthis for-
mulation, the expected profit equation can be written
E(ft) =F(L)—VTL—fO—W)L1M—W1
Maximizing this function with respect to L and W subject to the constraint W )
Wc and assuming L >0,itcan be shown that the first—order Kuhn—Tucker con-
ditions are
(5a) F'(L) =f(M—W)M+[l—f(M—W)]W= and,
(5b) w =— J1—f(M—w)1/1' fti—w) or
(5c)WW
c
depending on whether there is an interior or a corner solution.
If we have a corner solution, the firm will pay W as in the previous
model. However, in this model, the firm may decide to pay its workers more than
the competitive wage in order to decrease the probability of detection. Thus,
However, we would like to point out that such an extension reinforces the
results we derive below.—T —
thepassage of minimum wage legislation may alter the wages paid by employers
who do not fully comply with the law. This suggests that compliance should not
necessarily be viewed as a binary decision (i.e., a firm is either compliant or
nonconipliant), but rather as a matter of degree. In other words, the intuitive
notion that substantial noncompliance is tantamount to the absence of a minimum
wage law is technically incorrect and certainly misleading.
Observe that in this model, like in the previous model, the firm hires
labor up to the point at which the marginal product of labor is equal to a
weighted average of the wage it pays and the minimum wage, with the weights
being determined by the probability of being caught in both cases. But in this
model, the probability of being caught is endogenous because it depends on the
wage that is paid. Moreover, it is not possible to determine whether the firm
will hire more or less labor than in the previous model, even though it is
likely that the firm will pay a higher wage. This indeterminancy arises because
of the general nature of the inspection equation and because of the endogeneity
of the weights in this model. However, the important point to remember is that
firms will be off of their notional labor demand curves in this model. Thus,
minimum wage legislation will have adverse employment effects for firms that are
technically noncompliant.
IV.ModelC
The models presented in the two preceding sections are both one—period
static models. As such, they ignore dynamic influences on the firm's compliance
decision. Such influences are indeed present in the government's institutional—8—
machineryfor enforcing compliance with the minimum wage. Most notably, the
government imposes penalties in excess of back wages on repeat offenders. In
addition, firms that have previously been caught violating the minimum wage law
are more likely to be inspected by compliance officers in subsequent periods
than are firms for which there is no record of violation. In this section, we
extend Model B to a dynamic setting in order to analyze the implications of dif-
ferential treatment of first and second offenders.
Consider the following two—period model in which the probability of
inspection in each period is a function of the difference between the minimum
wage and the actual wage paid, and in which firms must pay back wagesif they
are caught violating the law. However, in the event of a second violation, we
assume that a lump—sum fine of C dollars has to be paid, in addition to back
wages. For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate and independent probabi—
ILities of inspection in periods 1 and 2. The substantive results we derive are
unchanged if either or both of these assumptions are relaxed.












where L1 and are labor demands in periods 1 and 2 and W1 and W2 are the wages
paid in periods 1 and 2. Expected profit is maximized with respect to
employment and wages in the two periods. We are interested in particular in the—9—
effect of the second—offender penalty (c) on the firm's behavior in the first
period.
Assuming an interior solution, the first—order conditions involving








Note that this expression for the wage is the same as in the previous model
except for the last term. Since the last term is positive, the firm will tend
to pay a higher wage in the first period than it would if there were no second—
offender penalty.9 Observe that the increase in the wage that the firm will pay
is equal to the probability of its being caught in the second period times the
fixed cost of the penalty per worker hired in the first period (i.e., the
expected cost per worker of the second—offender penalty). It can also he shown
that the firm hires less labor in the first period than it does in the previous




9This result holds generally provided that the second tern of (m),
which depends on W ,doesnot change in such a way that the effect of the third
term will he canceled. For example, it can be shown that the result holds if
the function f is approximately linear in the relevant domain.—10—
Since we assumed the production function to he strictly concave, the increase in
first period marginal product caused by the penalty in the second period leads
to lower employment in the first period.
Like Models A and B, this model yields the result that firms will make
employment decisions that are not consistent with their notional labor demands.
In addition, firms in this model will not comply with the minimum wage although
they are likely to pay wages that exceed those which would prevail in the
absence of minimum wage legislation. The key result of this model, however, is
thata system of higher penalties for second offenders will affect the behavior
of potential first offenders, and itwilldo so in a direction that is con-
sistent withthe goals of public policy. Intuitively, this result follows
because the establishment of a real penalty for second offenders affects the
capital value of the benefit firms receive from violating the minimum wage law.
In this model, that benefit has two components: the amount of the violation per
period and the number of periods that the violation goes undetected. Our result
reflects the firm's recognition of a tradeoff between the magnitude of viola-
tions, which are related to the probability of detection, and the number of
periods of successful violation.
V. Sumsaxr and Discussion
In this paper we have set out three simple models of firm behavior
under minimum wage legislation. In addition to considering both employment and
wage policies of the firm, these models incorporate important characteristics of
the government's actual enforcement mechanism that have been largely ignored in—11—
the literature on this subject. The main features of the models are: (1)
allowing the wage paid to be a choice variable in the calculus of profit maximi—
zation (Models A, B, and C);(2)letting the probability that minimum wage
violationsare detected depend on the magnitude of the violation (Models B and
C); and (3) examining the effect of having a penalty function which is upward
slopingin the number of previous offenses (Model c).
Theresultsof our modeling exercises are summarized in Figure I. The
two panels in this figure depict the firm's marginal (revenue) product of labor
schedule and its optimal wage—employment combinations under each of our three
models. Table I relates each of the three models (plus two reference cases) to
points in the two panels. Note the following conclusions: (i) incomplete
compliance forces firms off of their notional labor demand schedules; (2) higher
detection probabilities for more serious offenses result in higher wages paid,
but not in full compliance;and (3)the imposition of additional penalties on
second offenders increases the degree of compliance by firms with no previous
violations.
Taken together,theresults derived from these models lead to three
important conclusions. First, existing empirical work on the employment effect
of the minimum wage is likely to be seriously flawed. In particular, different
models generate this effect for complying and noncomplying firms. For example,
this effect will be determined by the slope of the marginal product of labor
schedule for firms that comply with the law; however, for noncomplying firms,
this effect will be primarily determined by the difference between the notional
and "rationed" labor demand schedules. Moreover, even though the employment—12—
effect with respect to the wage actually paid is larger for noncompliers than
for compliers, the estimated effect will be smaller since actual wage rates are
not observed and payment of the minimum wage is assumed. As a result, studies
which fail to account for noncompliance estimate some weighted average of the
two models and therefore underestimate the adverse employment effect of
increasing the minimum wage.
Second, economic regulation which is not coupled with enforcement
mechanisms which ensure full compliance may lead to behavior which seriously
thwarts the goals of public policy. In the present context, the existence of
minimum wage legislation suggests that society is willing to pay the price of
reduced employment is order to enjoy the social benefits associated with a mini-
mum wage. However, as our example makes clear, society's reliance on an enfor-
cement mechanism which does not guarantee full compliance is likely to keep
wages below the minimum, on the one hand, and to have negative employment
effects, on the other.
Finally, our results suggest that a variety of alternative mechanisms
can be used to enforce compliance with the law. In particular, high second—
offender penalties are a close substitute for high penalties and high detection
probabilities for first offenders. Indeed, since the government penalty sche-
dule is upward sloping in the number of minimum wage violations, it is incorrect
to conclude that compliance incentives are small just because backpay is the
main penalty faced by first offenders. Moreover, dynamic penalty schemes may
have greater social acceptability than static schemes since they provide incen-
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MathematicalAppendix
In this appendix we derive the main results discussed in Sections II,
III, and IV of the paper.
1. Model A
The Langrangian for this problem is
=F(L)—sqL-ALEM—WI+elw-w I
c
where U is the Lagrange multiplier. The first—order conditions for a maximum in
L, W, and U are:
(i) f=F'L) —w—x[M—w] c0;L> 0;
(2)-4Ix_lIL+oco; W)0;
(3) =W—
Wc)0;0 ) 0; ofI =o
SinceL >0in (1), --= 0and (2b) in the text. Since W >0in (2), M=
0implying 0 =El—AlL>0.Therefore,W =
Wc
in (3) and in (2a) in the text.
2. Model B
The Lagrangian for this problem is
£ =F(L)—wr—f(M—w)L[M—wl+a1w—siI
c
The first—order conditions for a maximun in L, W, and 0 are:
(1) If= F'(L)—W—f(M—W)LM—W]C 0; L ) 0; =0
(2) =—L+f(M—W)L+f'(M—W)LIM—WI+0C0; W >0;W* =0—15—
(3) =W—W> 0; 0 ) 0; 0 =0
Since L >0in (i), }= 0and (5a) in the text. Since W >0in (2), %= o.
This condition can hold for 0 >0,which implies a corner solution from (3) and
(Sc) in the text, and for 9 =0,which is consistent with an interior solution
and (5b) inthetext.
3. Model C
Assuming an interior solution, the first—order conditions involving















Dividing both sides of (2) by L1 and rearranging terms yields equation (Tb).
Derivation of equation (8):







Substitution of the expression for in (Tb) yields equation (8) after several
terms are cancelled.